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The unemployment rise in EU countries has been particularly strong for low-skilled workers.
This observation has often been explained in terms of biased technical change and relative wage
rigidities. More attention has been paid recently to an alternative mechanism, the crowding-out
of low-skilled workers by over-qualied workers. The objective of this paper is both methodolog-
ical and empirical. We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with two types of jobs
and two types of workers and with search unemployment. The model is calibrated and simulated
to examine the interactions between the \skill bias" and \crowding-out" mechanisms. When
such interactions are accounted for, the model reproduces quite well the observed unemployment
changes.
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JEL classi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The last decades have been characterized in many EU countries by a substantial increase in
the average unemployment rate. Average unemployment rate statistics hide dramatic dier-
ences across skill groups. The increase has remained fairly small for high-skilled workers, while
it is usually considerable for the least skilled groups. What caused this uneven development
remains a debated issue. There is ample evidence suggesting that technological progress and
other related factors (organizational change, capital-skill complementarity, etc...) may have
substantially increased the relative demand for skilled workers (see for instance Autor et al. [5],
Berman et al. [7], and Machin-Van Reenen [15]). We observed simultaneously a considerable
increase in the relative supply of highly educated workers. This context suggest that two types
of mechanisms may have contributed to the rise of low-skilled unemployment. The rst one is
the \skill bias technological change". It takes place when the net relative labor demand shift is
unfavorable to low-skilled workers (see for instance Manacorda-Petrongolo [16]). If not compen-
sated by relative wage adjustments, such a net demand change leads to larger unemployment
rate dierentials. Increasing attention has been paid recently to an alternative mechanism. Sev-
eral recent empirical studies suggest that a signicant and increasing proportion of low-skilled
jobs are nowadays held by highly educated, over-qualied workers (see for instance Hartog [14]).
There may be a variety of reasons why rms may choose or accept to hire high-skilled workers
on low-skilled positions (imperfections of the matching process, productivity dierences, etc...).
Whatever these reasons, these empirical ndings suggest a story quite dierent from the \skill
bias technological change". The rise in low-skilled unemployment would not be the result of a
net relative demand shift; it would rather be the consequence of the relative supply shift itself,
which increased job competition and the \crowding-out" of the least skilled workers.
Both scenarios, skill bias change and crowding-out, are a priori plausible, and may indeed have
taken place simultaneously. The objective of this paper is twofold. It rst aims at contributing
to a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the two scenarios and their possible
interactions. It also aims at providing a quantitative assessment of the respective contributions
of \skill bias" and \crowding-out" phenomena to the overall low-skilled unemployment rise.
The specication of our model builds on earlier work on these issues. Mortensen-Pissarides [19]examine the consequences of a skilled-bias technological change in a model with matching fric-
tions and a continuum of skill levels. The distribution of the labor force population over these
skill levels is exogenously given. All rms are single job rms and produce the same goods.
Dierent rms may however use dierent technologies. The distribution of rm types is endoge-
nous: when opening a vacancy, a rm must specify the chosen technology and the corresponding
minimal skill requirement; this decision is irreversible. A higher skill requirement is associ-
ated to a higher productivity level. The authors focus on the case where the labor market is
perfectly segmented, so that there is no job competition across skill groups. Wages are deter-
mined by Nash bargaining. If the economic value of non-employment (unemployment benet)
is the same for all skill groups, the wage-productivity ratio will be higher for the less productive
workers, implying a higher equilibrium unemployment rate on the corresponding segment of the
labor market. A skill-biased technological change (dened as a mean-preserving increase in the
spread of the distribution of labor productivity across workers) exacerbates these dierences,
by increasing the unemployment rate of less skilled workers and decreasing that of high-skilled
workers. The aggregate equilibrium unemployment rate increases if the positive eect on less
skilled unemployment dominates the negative eect on high skilled unemployment. The authors
show that the magnitude of such eects depends on labor market institutions (job protection,
unemployment benets).
This type of model can be extended to include job competition eects provided one accepts the
simplifying assumptions that the job destruction rate is exogenous, and there are only two skill
groups and two types of jobs. In Gautier [12] and Albrecht-Vroman [3], each rm decides ex
ante which type of job vacancy (complex or simple) to open (one could say alternatively that
she chooses ex ante whether she will use a high- or a low-tech production technology). The
proportion of each type of job is determined endogenously by the free entry conditions. Low-
skilled workers can only perform simple tasks. High-skilled workers can carry out both complex
and simple tasks; their productivity on simple tasks (for which they are \over-qualied") may
be higher or lower than that of low-skilled workers. One main dierence between the Gautier
and the Albrecht-Vroman models comes from the representation of the matching process. Both
models use matching functions  a la Pissarides [22]. Albrecht-Vroman [3] represent the whole
2matching process by a single matching function and assume that a match is consummated if
and only if the total surplus to be shared between the rm and the worker is non-negative1.
Gautier [12] allows instead low-skilled workers to direct their search on simple jobs by introducing
a dierent matching function for each type of job. Job competition is introduced by allowing
high-skilled job seekers to search simultaneously on the complex and the simple job markets.
When hired on a simple job, they may continue searching for a (better-paid) complex job.
These models provide important insights on the externalities associated to matching processes
and on their implications for technological change and job competition mechanisms. In such
setups, an exogenous increase in the proportion of high-skilled workers increases the number
of complex jobs (high-tech rms) and thus induces an endogenous technological change2. It
typically also increases the number of high-skilled workers on simple jobs. This crowding-out
eect will in general increase low-skilled unemployment, except if high-skilled workers employed
on simple jobs are suciently more productive than low-skilled workers. In that case, rms have
an incentive to open more simple job vacancies; this creates more job opportunities for low-
skilled workers as well (positive externality). Dolado et al. [10] and [11] use similar modelling
approaches to investigate the potential impact of the increased proportion of highly educated
workers and of job competition on low-skilled employment opportunities in Spain. Collard et
al. [9] provide a rst attempt to include this type of quantitative analysis in a dynamic general
equilibrium setup with capital accumulation.
We will follow Collard et al. [9] and adopt an intertemporal general equilibrium framework
similar to that of Andolfatto [4] and Merz [18], with endogenous capital and interest rate. We
build on their work though by modelling labor market 
ows in a way similar to Gautier [12].
This approach allows us to introduce endogenous search intensities for high-skilled job seekers.
High-skilled unemployed workers may search simultaneously on the complex and the simple job
1Marimon-Zilbotti [17] use a similar search-matching representation to examine the consequences of a biased
technological shock. His model diers however from the one developed in this paper by its denition of workers
and rms types (in terms of specic \talents" rather than skill levels). The productivity of a match is a negative
function of the distance between the worker's and the rm's types (talent mismatch). A biased technological
shock is represented in that setup by a stronger negative eect of talent mismatch on productivity.
2Similar mechanisms of endogenous technological change have been suggested by Acemoglu [1] and [2] and
Beaudry and Green [6] for instance.
3markets (as in Gautier), but allocate their search time on each market so as to maximize expected
utility. In this setup, lower employment and wage perspectives on the complex job market induce
high-skilled unemployed workers to spend a larger fraction of their search time on the simple job
market and thus lead to more crowding-out of low-skilled workers. The possibility of on-the-job
search (continuing to search for a complex job while working on a simple job) reinforces such
eects. On-the-job search intensity is again determined by expected utility maximization, with
the opportunity cost of on-the-job search equal to the marginal utility of leisure.
As most authors in this literature, we will assume single job rms. The main motivation for
this simplication is to keep a tractable representation of the wage bargaining process. We do
not want to assume though that \high-tech" and \low-tech" rms (oering respectively complex
and simple jobs) produce perfectly substitutable goods. This assumption would considerably
simplify the representation of the production process. It would amount though to assuming
that all workers are perfectly substitutable inputs diering only by their productivity level.
We will follow a dierent route. Instead of assuming perfect substitutability, we will assume
that high-tech and low-tech rms produce dierent intermediate goods, used as inputs in the
production of nal goods, in combination with capital. The nal goods production function
will be specied as a Cobb-Douglas function, as in standard dynamic macroeconomic models,
extended here to distinguish two types of jobs and the corresponding intermediate goods. This
specication implies a more realistic value of the elasticity of substitution between low- and
high-skilled workers (substitution elasticity equal to one rather than innity). It also implies
that the marginal productivity of each type of job is decreasing. A biased technological change
can in this setup be introduced as an exogenous change in the coecients of the Cobb-Douglas
function, implying an exogenous change in the relative demand for high-tech and low-tech in-
termediate goods, which in turn changes the relative demand for high- and low-skilled labor.
This formulation is in line with econometric estimates of the technological bias as reported for
instance in Manacorda-Petrongolo [16].
In many European countries, relative wages have remained remarkably stable despite huge un-
employment rate dierences across skill groups. These relative wage rigidities may be the result
of legal restrictions like minimum wages, or be the results of agreements negotiated at the sec-
4toral or national levels. The standard assumption that all wages are determined by individual
wage negotiations may thus imply much more relative wage 
exibility than actually observed
and may be quite misleading. To better understand the consequences of relative wage rigidi-
ties in the face of relative labor demand or relative labor supply changes, we will start from
the assumption that wages paid on simple jobs are indexed on those paid on complex jobs,
the latter being determined by the usual sharing rule. We compare the results obtained with
this assumption to those obtained with the standard representation where all wages are freely
negotiated.
The quantitative results are obtained by calibrating the parameters on the Belgian economy.
Unemployment rate changes observed in Belgium over the last twenty ve years have been close
to those observed on average at the European level. The analysis of the Belgian case may thus
provide insights on what happened in other countries as well. We evaluate the consequences of
relative labor demand and relative labor supply changes over the period 1976-1996 and discuss
the role of relative wage rigidities and of job competition. The model is calibrated to repro-
duce the situation observed in 1996. We next recalculate the equilibrium with all parameter
values unchanged except two of them, the proportion of high-skilled workers in the total labor
force and the complex goods Cobb-Douglas productivity coecient, which are given their 1976
values. These two parameter changes suce to generate unemployment rate changes quite sim-
ilar to those observed between 1976 and 1996, suggesting that net relative labor demand shifts
combined to relative wage rigidities are one of the main cause of the unemployment rise. This
numerical exercice also shows that both \skill bias" and \crowding-out" mechanisms contribute
to explain the observed changes. The two mechanisms should thus be seen as complementary
rather than competing explanations of the rise in low-skilled unemployment. More insights on
these mechanisms are obtained by simulating the eects of various types of shocks (aggregate
technological shock, biased technological shock, wage shock, labor force composition changes,
etc...) in various settings (
exible or rigid relative wages, job competition or perfect labor market
segmentation).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the description of rms
and households behaviors and market mechanisms (matching processes, wage bargaining). We
5next (section 3) calibrate the model and examine its properties through comparative static and
dynamic simulation exercises. Section 4 concludes with a few remarks.
2 The Model
There are two broad categories of agents, households and rms. We assume a single represen-
tative household3. All members of the household supply inelastically one unit of labor. These
consumer-workers may however have dierent skill levels (be low- or high-skilled workers); they
may be employed or unemployed.
We distinguish three types of rms: two types of intermediate goods rms, producing respec-
tively high- and low-tech intermediate goods with labor as sole input, and one representative
nal rm, combining capital and the two intermediate goods to produce an homogeneous nal
goods. The nal goods can be either consumed or accumulated by the representative household.
The production of high-tech intermediate goods involves complex tasks that can only be carried
out by skilled labor. The production of low-tech intermediate goods is made of simpler tasks
that can be carried out by both low- or high-skilled workers. There is thus a double heterogene-
ity as in Gautier [12], heterogeneity of jobs (simple vs complex) and heterogeneity of workers
(high- and low-skilled).
There are three types of markets: labor, goods and capital. On the labor side, we distinguish
the complex and the simple job markets. For each type of job, we assume an exogenous job
destruction rate and represent the matching process by a standard matching function. Because
they know that their application will always be turned down, low-skilled job seekers never apply
for complex jobs. High-skilled unemployed workers may look for both types of jobs. High-skilled
workers hired on a simple job may continue searching for a complex job (on-the-job search). All
goods markets (the two intermediate goods and the nal goods markets) are assumed to be
perfectly competitive. The price of the nal goods is normalized to one. On the capital market,
3This representative household formulation amounts to assuming that workers are perfectly insured against
the unemployment risk. This simplication is common in the literature and re
ects the current state of the art.
Taking into account workers heterogeneity due to imperfect insurance markets would make the model totally
untractable.
6the supply is determined by the stock of capital previously accumulated by the household. The
interest rate adjusts to make the quantity demanded by the representative nal rm equal to
this predetermined capital stock.
Labor market 
ows are detailed in the next subsection. We next successively discuss rms and
households behaviors, and the wage determination process.
2.1 Labor Market Flows
Let Nc
t and Ns
t represent the total number of complex and simple jobs respectively. Simple
jobs can be occupied by high- (Nsh
t ) or low-skilled (Nsl




Normalizing the total labor force to one and denoting  the (exogenous) proportion of high-
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where Uh
t and Ul
t denote the number of high- and low-skilled unemployed job-seekers respectively.
Let the number of complex and simple job matches be denoted by M c
t and Ms
t respectively.
We assume that the number of such matches is a function of the number of corresponding job
vacancies (V c
t and V s
t ) and eective job seekers (number of job seekers corrected by search
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where sct, sst and sot represent search eciencies; the search eciency of the low-skilled worker
on the simple job market is normalized to one. Both matching functions are assumed to be
linear homogeneous.


















With linear homogeneous matching functions, the probabilities of nding a complex or a simple
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Figure 1: Labor market 
ows and transition probabilities
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lling a complex and a




























t having negative rst derivatives. The probability that a simple job is lled is the


















Finally, we assume two exogenous job destruction rates   (for the complex jobs) and  (for the
simple jobs), implying for each type of job and worker the following employment dynamics (in
terms of vacancies and job-seekers' search eort respectively):
Nc

































Figure 1 summarizes these labor market 
ows and transition probabilities. Armed with these
denitions and notations, we can now describe rms and household behaviors.
82.2 The Intermediate Goods Firms
We distinguish \high-tech" or \low-tech" intermediate goods rms. All are assumed to be single
job rms. High-tech (resp. low-tech) rms oer complex (resp. simple) jobs.
The asset values of a complex vacancy and of a lled complex job will be denoted W V C and
WFC respectively. Given the transition probabilities dened in the previous subsection, these
values are determined by:
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where a denotes the cost of keeping the complex vacancy opened, while cc
t stands for the market
price of a complex (high-tech) goods and wc
t is the wage paid to the high-skilled worker. The
productivity of the latter is equal to yc.
Asset values for simple vacancies and jobs take more complicated forms because these positions
may be held by low- or by high-skilled workers. Because of high-skilled workers search behavior,
high- and low-skilled workers have dierent hiring and exit probabilities. They also have dierent
productivity levels. The productivity of a high-skilled worker on a simple job is equal to ys;
the productivity of a low-skilled worker is assumed to be a fraction  of the latter4. Let W V S
denote the asset value of a simple vacancy, while W FSH and W FSL denote the asset values of a
lled simple job held by a high-skilled and a low-skilled worker respectively. These asset values
are determined by the following dynamic equations:
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where b denotes the cost of keeping the simple vacancy opened, while cs
t stands for the market
price of a simple (low-tech) goods. The wages paid by low-tech rms to high- or low-skilled
4A priori,  could be lower or higher than 1. In other words, a low-skilled could be less or more productive
than a high-skilled on a simple job.
9workers are denoted wsh
t and wsl
t respectively.
Finally, the number of high- or low-tech rms is determined by the usual free entry conditions
(WV C
t = WV S
t = 0).
2.3 The Representative Final Firm
We assume a representative nal rm. Producing the nal goods yt requires three types of
inputs: capital Kt, high-tech (complex) intermediate goods Qc
t, low-tech (simple) intermediate
goods Qs















t   (rt + )Kt; (15)
where F(:) is a linear homogeneous production function, rt is the net interest rate paid to capital
owners and  an exogenous capital depreciation rate. The rst-order optimality conditions can
then be written as follows:





where FXt is the rst-partial derivative of F(:) with respect to Xt. Because the intermediate
goods prices cc
t and cs
t are market-clearing prices, we also have:
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2.4 The Representative Household
Let the representative household's value function be represented by the following function of the










All members of the household supply inelastically one unit of labor. The decision variables of
the household are the consumption level Ct and the search eorts of job seekers. We assume
that low-skilled unemployed workers devote all their time searching on the simple job market.
5As mentioned before, assuming a representative household amounts to assuming perfect unemployment in-
surance, a usual assumption in this type of models.
10Their search eciency is normalized to one. High-skilled unemployed workers allocate their total
search time (normalized to one) between the simple and the complex job markets. Their search
eciency on the complex (resp. simple) job market, denoted sct (resp. sst), is an increasing
and concave function of the search time devoted to that market (eut and (1 eut) respectively).
High-skilled workers employed on a simple job may spend a fraction eot of their leisure time
searching for a better paid complex job. Their on-the-job search eciency sot is an increasing
concave function of eot.
With these denitions and notations, the household optimization programme can be written in
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U(:) is an increasing and concave utility function, D(:) is an increasing and convex disutility
function,  is a subjective discount factor. The optimization is subject to constraints (1), (7-b),
(8-b), (9-b) and to the 














+ (rt + )Kt + t
= Kt+1   (1   )Kt + Ct + Tt ;
(20)
where wu
t stands for the benets received by an unemployed worker, t stands for the prots
(value added net of labor and vacancy costs) redistributed by intermediate rms and Tt stands
for the (lump sum) taxes levied to nance the unemployment benets. The rst-order optimality
conditions can then be written as follows:
UCt =  Et

























Equation (21) denes the intertemporal consumption path while the equations (22) and (23)
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These equations represent the household's marginal value functions and are equivalent, but for
the household, to equations (11), (13) and (14).
2.5 Wage Determination
We assume that the wage wc
t paid to a worker on a complex job is renegotiated every time
with the intermediate rm. The bargained wage is determined by the maximization of the Nash
















where c represents the high-skilled worker's bargaining power6. The rst order condition gives,











Concerning wages paid on simple jobs, we contrast two cases. We rst assume that this wage








This amounts to assuming a rigid, exogenous relative wage (
) between simple and complex
jobs, resulting for instance from centralized labor market regulations and institutions. This
6The household's surplus is in utility term while the rm surplus is in monetary term. To have the same units,
we divide the household's surplus by the utility. See for instance Merz [18] for a similar equation.
12assumption is motivated by the observation that the relative wage of low-skilled workers has in
many countries remained quite stable over the last decades7.
In order to better evaluate the implications of relative wage rigidities, we contrast the results
obtained under the rigid relative wage assumption to those obtained under an assumption of
individual wage bargaining similar to that taking place for complex jobs. More formally, we
will contrast the rst specication with the alternative one where the wage wsl
t (resp. wsh
t )
paid to a low-skilled (resp. high-skilled) worker employed on a simple job is determined by the
maximization of the Nash product. The wage wsh
t paid to high-skilled workers on simple jobs is























where s represents the worker's bargaining power. The wages wsl
t and wsh
t so obtained will in
general dier, because low-and high-skilled workers have dierent productivity levels ( 6= 1)
and exit probabilities (as a result of on-the-job-search by high-skilled workers).
Finally, the unemployment benet wu
t is assumed to be the same for all workers and indexed on
the average wage.
3 Model Calibration and Simulations
In this section we calibrate the model and use deterministic simulation exercises to illustrate the
properties of the model and gain insights on the eects of various types of shocks. The focus is
on search intensities, unemployment rate dierences (across skill groups) and crowding-out.
7In OECD [20], data (from 1979 to 1995) about the distribution of earnings (D9/D5 (ratio of the upper earnings
limit of the ninth decile of workers to the upper limit of the fth decile) and D5/D1) are provided for eleven EU
countries. For all these countries (except in UK), these ratios remain fairly stable all over the period studied.
133.1 Calibration
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matching function (complex jobs) (33)










Ut = lnCt instantaneous utility function (35)















eot search eciency (iii) (39)
The matching function on each job market (simple and complex) is represented by the usual
Cobb-Douglas specication with constant returns to scale. We follow Manacorda and Petron-
golo [16] and use also a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function with three inputs to
represent the technological constraints faced by the representative nal rm. A biased techno-
logical change favorable to high-skilled labor is in this setup represented by an increase in the
value of parameter . A larger value of  increases (resp. decreases) the elasticity of output with
respect to complex (resp. simple) goods. As in many RBC models, we represent the instanta-
neous utility of consumption by the logarithm of consumption expenditures. All workers supply
inelastically one unit of their time. If unemployed, this time is entirely devoted to search. We
still have to describe how much leisure time high-skilled workers employed on simple jobs will
devote to on-the-job search, and how much of their total search time high-skilled unemployed
workers will devote on the simple (rather than complex) job market. The disutility of devoting
some of its leisure time to on-the-job search is assumed to be linear. We represent the rela-
tionship between search time and search eciency by a concave function (more precisely, search
eciency is a linear function of the square root of search time).
The numerical values given to the parameters of these functions are reported in table 1. One
period of time corresponds to one quarter. As in most RBC models, the psychological discount
factor () is set to 0.99, implying a steady state real interest rate of 0.01 (real interest rate of
144% per annum). Parameter  is the elasticity of output with respect to capital, and coincides
the capital share of total income. We set it at the standard value 0.33. The depreciation rate
 is set to 0.025 and implies a steady state capital-output ratio of 9. The labour productivities
yc and ys in the complex and simple intermediate goods rms are (without loss of generality)
normalized to 1. The relative eciency of a low-skilled worker on a simple job () is set at
0.8. This value is such that, although the low-skilled worker's productivity is large enough to
generate a positive surplus, the intermediate goods rm would prefer to ll a simple job vacancy
with a high-skilled worker (more formally  = 0:8 implies W FSH > WFSL > 0)8. This seems a
natural assumption in a model focusing on job competition. This particular choice has however
little impact on the properties of the model (see below). We assume that recruiting costs are
higher for complex jobs (a > b). Our calibration of a and b implies that total vacancy costs
represent 3.7% of total labor costs, 2.5% of output.
Most of the remaining parameters are calibrated on Belgian data. The reference period is the
second half of the nineties (mainly 1995-97), a period during which the Belgian economy was
neither in a recession nor in a boom. The worker's skill level is dened in terms of educational
attainment; the proportion  of high-skilled workers is dened as the proportion of workers with
a education level equal to a upper-secondary degree or more. We set  and  (the elasticity of
output with respect to complex jobs) at values corresponding to the 1995-96 values obtained by
Sneessens and Shadman [23] for Belgium ( = 0:67;  = 0:51). The elasticity of job matches
with respect to vacancies () is usually estimated to be in between 0.4 and 0.6. Using 1997
Belgian data, Van der Linden and Dor [25] estimate it at 0.4 (without distinction between high-
and low-skilled jobs) and we therefore follow them by setting c = s = 0:4, for both complex
and simple jobs.
The parameter determining the worker's share of a match surplus is usually set at the same
value as the coecient of unemployment in the matching function (see for instance Merz [18]
and Andolfatto [4])9. We follow this practice in choosing the value of c (the wage rule on the
8Although a rm prefers a high-skilled, it never refuses a low-skilled. Indeed, given q





9Their motivation is the so-called Hosios-Pissarides condition: in models like Merz's or Andolfatto's, this
sharing rule implies that the decentralized economy gives the same outcomes as the social planner problem.




  0.025  0.05
Matching functions
mc
0 0.40 c 0.40
ms
0 0.30 s 0.40
Production functions
 0.33  0.51
e 1.00  0.80
yc 1.00 ys 1.00













a 0.90 b 0.26
Wages determination
c 0.60 s 0.77
wu 0.34 
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Psychological discount and capital depreciation
 0.99  0.025
Table 1: Numerical parameter values
complex job market), although in our setup it will not imply that the decentralized economy
yields a social optimum. As discussed and motivated in section 2.5, we will assume that wages
on the simple job market are a constant fraction of the complex wage. This ratio of simple
to complex wages (
) is xed at 2/3. This value is close to the D1/D9 value reported by the
OECD [20] for Belgium, and coincides with the relative mean gross wage of the 33% lowest-paid
workers (see ONSS [21]). In order to evaluate the role of this relative wage rigidity in determining
the economy's responses to shocks, we want compare the results obtained under this assumption
with those obtained under the assumption of bargained simple wages, with share parameter
s. The latter parameter is set at a value such that the initial (reference) steady state values
are similar in both modelling strategies10. This implies s = 0:77. The value of the average
replacement ratio wu is set at 0.34, the value obtained by Van der Linden and Dor [25] for
10They cannot be exactly identical because in the bargained wage case w
sh and w
sl will in general be dierent.
16Belgium in 199711. The same authors estimate a lower bound for the job destruction rate (or
transition rate from employment to unemployment) equal to 0.013 (monthly data). Simple jobs
being typically more precarious than complex jobs, we impose the complex jobs destruction rate
  to be lower than the simple jobs destruction rate . Using the Van der Linden and Dor [25]
lower-bound estimate as a reference, we set the complex and simple job destruction rates at
  = 0:025 and  = 0:05 respectively (quarterly data).
We still have to x the following nine parameters: the two matching eciencies mc
o and ms
o,
the six parameters of the search eciency functions and the disutility parameter . The three
slope parameters in the search eciency functions (x
1 ; xfsc;ss;sog ) play an important role
in determining the eects of shocks. We want these slopes to be as large as possible without
generating negative values for the job asset values W FSH
t ; WH
Nsc




and (24)-(25)). We are then left with six parameters. We choose their values so as to satisfy the
following six steady state conditions: low- and high-skilled unemployment rates around 0.20 and
0.07 respectively (values obtained from Sneessens and Shadman [23] for Belgium, updated for
1995-96); probabilities to nd a complex job and a simple job equal to pc = 0:40 and ps = 0:20
respectively (estimates based on Cockx and Dejemeppe [8] for the early nineties)12; and equal
probabilities (around 0.50) to ll complex or simple vacancies (qc and qs respectively). These
latter values are based on Delmotte et al. [24]. They report that, in 2000, 52% of the total
vacancies were easily lled (within 3 months), 25% were lled with diculty (vacancies open
more than 3 months) and 33% were never lled. Carefully examining which types of jobs are
most easily lled does not suggest any dierence between complex jobs and simple jobs.
A result of these calibration exercise is that the proportion of high-skilled workers on simple
jobs must be around 8% (see table 2). This \crowding-out" eect may look rather small, if
compared to the estimates reported in Delmotte et al. [24]. Delmotte et al. [24] used survey















12The probability that a worker nds a job during the rst three months of unemployment is estimated at 0.64
for a worker with some post-secondary education, 0.39 with upper secondary education, 0.30 with lower secondary
education and 0.28 with primary education or no education. The values kept for p
c and p
s take into account
both our denition of the two skill groups and the fact that rst trimester exit probabilities should be regarded
as upper bounds.
17questionnaires with business rms to compare the skill requirements of job vacancies and the
skill characteristics of the workers who lled these vacancies. A worker is considered to be
overeducated when its education level is superior to that demanded by the rm when opening
the vacancy. Delmotte et al. [24] obtain that in 2000, 24% of all hired workers were overeducated.
This gure may however overestimate the true number of overeducated workers if for instance the
education level indicated by rm when opening a vacancy is meant to give a lower bound rather
than a strict requirement. Hartog [14], collecting empirical results from various studies, reports
estimates ranging from 10 to 30% in EU countries during the rst half of the nineties. Our own
gure is just slightly below the low end of this range. If we keep in mind that distinguishing only
two skill categories (rather than three or more) will mechanically and maybe drastically reduce
the number of \overeducated" workers, the gure that we obtain with our calibrated model may
seem realistic enough.
3.2 Responses to shocks
To better understand the properties of the model, we use numerical simulations and examine
the consequences of specic shocks. We focus here on the model with rigid relative wages. The
results of these comparative static exercises are summarized in table 2. The rst row of the table
reports the stationary state values of the main endogenous variables in the reference scenario.
The other rows report the eects of the shocks. The eect is measured by the percentage
deviation (percentage point dierence when the initial variable is already expressed in percent)
with respect to the value in the reference scenario. We consider seven types of shocks: labor
force composition changes, four types of productivity shocks and two types of wage shocks. We
brie
y comment each exercise, starting with the aggregate productivity shock.
At unchanged unemployment benets and vacancy costs, a positive aggregate productivity shock
(e > 0, equal to 3% in table 2) stimulates the demand for all types of inputs. This overall
stimulus leaves high-skilled workers' search behaviors almost unchanged. Crowding-out turns
out to be only very slightly contra-cyclical, a result that is compatible with the empirical results
obtained by Gautier et al. [13]. There is a strong increase in capital accumulation and output,
and simultaneously a strong increase in wages (hence a weak employment eect). These results
18eu eo Uh= Ul=(1   ) Uh + Ul wc y Nsh=Ns
benchmark 81.32% 9.39% 6.89% 20.72% 11.45% 1.16 1.44 8.26%
e : 1:00 ! 1:03 +0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.28 -0.17 +4.59% +4.71% -0.15
 : 0:67 ! 0:70 -9.41 -0.78 -1.04 -4.88 -2.61 -0.48% +3.47% +3.47
 : 0:51 ! 0:53 +9.66 +0.78 +1.10 +8.49 +3.54 +3.38% +0.03% -2.63
yc=ys : 1:00 ! 1:17 +0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 +1.23% +1.26% -0.04
 : 0:80 ! 0:90 +0.13 -0.00 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 +2.59% +2.66% -0.11

 : 2=3 ! 0:70 +1.46 -1.71 +0.45 +2.62 +1.17 -0.94% -1.06% -0.45
wu : 0:34 ! 0:40 +2.03 -0.14 +0.20 +0.29 +0.23 +0.20% -0.25% +0.06
Table 2: Steady state eects (deviations from the benchmark) of shocks in the model with rigid
relative wages
do not depend on the assumption that high-skilled workers employed on simple jobs are more
productive than low-skilled workers. They are quite similar if we assume that wages paid on
simple jobs are negotiated rather than indexed on complex wages.
A rise in the proportion of high-skilled workers in the total labor force ( > 0, equal to 3
percentage points in table 2)13 leads to more output, more crowding-out, and also to a decrease
in all unemployment rates. The rst two results are somewhat anticipated, and similar to those
obtained for instance in Gautier [12]. The last one may look a priori more surprising. It
does not depend on the assumption that high-skilled workers employed on simple jobs are more
productive than low-skilled workers: assuming identical productivity levels ( = 1:00) yields
similar unemployment rate changes. The result is related both to our representation of the
production process and to job competition. Let us rst assume away job competition eects
and consider perfectly segmented labor markets14. It is intuitively clear that an increase (resp.
decrease) in the supply of high-skilled (resp. low-skilled) labor will lead to an increase (resp.
decrease) in the number of employed workers of that type, although their unemployment rate
may increase (resp. decrease). By combining equations (17) and (34), it is readily seen that
13This amounts to a 14.9 percentage points increase in the ratio of high- to low-skilled labor forces.
14We did compute the corresponding numerical simulation.
19an increase in high-skilled employment will ceteris paribus increase the marginal productivity of
low-skilled workers (in nal goods terms). The result will be a lower low-skilled unemployment
rate, as in the case of a positive aggregate productivity shock. Similarly, a decrease in low-skilled
employment will ceteris paribus decrease the marginal productivity of high-skilled workers (in
terms of nal goods) and increase the high-skilled unemployment rate, as in the case of a negative
aggregate productivity shock. Once we introduce the possibility of job competition, the lower
low-skilled unemployment rate and the increased tightness on the simple job market gives to
high-skilled workers a stronger incentive to look for a simple job. There is thus more crowding-
out. This crowding-out eect is large enough to change the sign of the eect of the population
change on the high-skilled unemployment rate. All unemployment rate are thus decreased. We
obtain the same (qualitative) result with both rigid and 
exible relative wages.
Increasing the relative productivity of high-tech intermediate goods ( = 0:02 > 0 in table
2)15 is a rst way of introducing a biased technological change. Combining equations (17) and
(34) shows that this change will increase the marginal productivity (in nal goods terms) of
high-skilled labor, and decrease that of low-skilled labor. Without job competition eects, the
high-skilled unemployment rate would decrease and the low-skilled unemployment rate would
increase, as in Mortensen-Pissarides [19]. However, when the simple and complex job markets
are not perfectly segmented, the decrease in the probability to nd a simple job induces high-
skilled workers to search more intensively on the complex job market. The consequence is a lower
crowding-out eect on the simple job market and more congestion on the complex job market.
High-skilled workers' search behavior reduces the impact of the relative demand change on the
low-skilled unemployment rate, and makes the high-skilled unemployment rate increase rather
than decrease (the increase in the number of complex jobs is not large enough to compensate
the decrease in the number of high-skilled workers employed on simple jobs). All unemployment
rates thus go up as a result of the biased technical change (see table 2). The eect on output is
positive, but remains weak when relative wages are rigid (because the wage paid on simple job
increases rather than decrease).
15This amounts to a 18.8 percentage points increase in the relative productivity coecient of complex and
simple intermediate goods.
20Increasing the relative productivity of workers on complex jobs ((yc=ys) = +0:17 in table 2)
provides another means of introducing a biased technological change favorable to high-skilled
workers. Its eects are however totally dierent. By combining equations (34) and (17), it
is readily seen that it is essentially equivalent to a combination of (positive) high-skilled and
(negative) low-skilled labor-augmenting technical progresses. In a Cobb-Douglas framework,
labor-augmenting and output-augmenting technical progresses have similar eects. Increasing
the relative productivity of workers on complex jobs ((yc=ys) > 0) has thus in our setup the
same qualitative eects as an aggregate productivity shock (e > 0). This comparison between
the two ways of introducing a biased technological change illustrates how much the analysis of job
competition and crowding out eects depends on the modelling of the technological constraints.
Increasing the relative productivity of low-skilled workers on simple jobs ( = +0:10 in table
2) increases total output and wages. As earlier remarks had already suggested, it has a limited
impact on search behaviors and crowding-out.
Increasing the low-skilled relative wage (
 > 0 in table 2) has a strong negative eect on
the number of simple jobs. The supply of simple intermediate goods decreases, which aects
negatively the demand for capital and for complex goods. All unemployment rates increase,
especially the low-skilled one. The decrease in the number of simple jobs induces high-skilled
unemployed workers to search more intensively on the complex job market, which slightly reduces
the crowding-out eect. Finally, increasing the replacement ratio (wu > 0 in table 2) has
the usual eects of increasing wages and unemployment rates. These eects remain moderate
though, at least in this setup with a single representative household and no discouragement
eect.
3.3 Explaining the rise in low-skilled unemployment
As mentioned before, our model has been calibrated on Belgian data and more or less reproduces
the situation observed in 1996. Our objective in this section is to check to what extent the rise
in low-skilled unemployment observed after 1975 can be explained by relative labor demand
and supply changes. We thus recalculate the equilibrium values of the unemployment rates and
the other endogenous variables obtained by changing only two parameters, the proportion of
21high-skilled workers  and the productivity coecient of complex intermediate goods . This
exercise is done under two alternative representations of the wage formation process, rigid vs





The rst two columns of table 3 reproduce the 1996 values of , , and the change observed
over the period 1977-1996. These values are taken from Sneessens and Shadman [23]. The
measure of the change in  is based on labor force statistics; the measure of the change in 
is based on the estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs (two types
of labor and capital). The net skill bias (NBS in the third column of table 3) is a measure of
the net relative demand change. It is dened as the ratio of the relative productivity coecient
(=(1      )) and the relative labor force (=(1   )) of high- and low-skilled workers. In
a simple model without vacancy costs and job competition, the dierence between the low-
and the high-skilled equilibrium unemployment rates would remain unchanged as long as NSB
is unchanged; a positive change in NSB increases the dierence between the two equilibrium
unemployment rates if the relative wage is rigid16. From 1977 till 1996, the net skill bias
increased by twenty-eight percentage points.
The last four columns of table 3 reproduce the observed and simulated values of the endogenous
variables of interest: high- and low-skilled unemployment rates, relative wage and crowding-
out. The model with rigid relative wages reproduces pretty well the changes observed over
the period 1977-96: the high-skilled unemployment rate increases moderately (+2:7 percentage
points in the simulation, +2:1 in the data), while the low-skilled unemployment rate rises strongly
(+10:1 in the simulation, +13:3 in the data). In the simulation, the proportion of simple jobs
held by high-skilled workers (crowding-out) increases from 1:8% to 8:3% (+6:5). This suggests
that although the 1996 gure may look rather low in absolute value (compared to estimates
based on surveys and a totally dierent denition of skills), job competition and crowding-
out may have contributed substantially to the rise of low-skilled unemployment. Repeating














22  NSB Uh= Ul=(1   ) wsl=wc crowding
out
Actual data
1996 0.67 0.51 1.59 6.8% 20.1% 67% n.a.
1977-96 +0.45 +0.33 +0.28 +2.1 +13.3 +0.0 n.a.
Model with rigid relative wages
1977-96 +0.45 +0.33 +0.28 +2.7 +10.1 +0.0 +6.5
Model with 
exible relative wages
1977-96 +0.45 +0.33 +0.28 +0.4 +2.4 -15.5 +7.2
Table 3: Skill bias, unemployment and relative wages: comparing actual and simulated data
the same simulation experiment but this time eliminating the possibility of job competition (i.e.
assuming a perfectly segmented labor market) conrms this conjecture: the change is low-skilled
unemployment induced by the net skill bias change is equal to 5 percentage points, compared
to 10 in the model with job competition. The two mechanisms, skill bias technological change
and crowding-out, may have both contributed signicantly to the observed rise in low-skilled
unemployment.
The last part of table 3 reproduces the simulation results obtained in the alternative specication
with 
exible relative wages. The increase in the low-skilled unemployment rate now remains
moderate (+2:4 percentage points), at the cost though of a 15:5% decrease in the relative wage
of low-skilled workers (wsl=wc). There is also a slight increase in the high-skilled unemployment
rate and a substantial increase in crowding-out. This increased crowding-out may seem strange
given the decrease (in both absolute and relative terms) observed in the wage paid on simple
jobs. Two eects are at work: the lower wage makes the simple job less attractive, at the same
time though it increases the number of jobs and the probability of be hired.
Dynamics
Up to now we focused on the long term consequences. To illustrate the dynamic adjustment
process, we should take into account that these changes in  and  were spread over several years.
23For numerical reasons, we focused on a subperiod corresponding to the years 1980-1993. The
changes in the values of ,  and the corresponding net skill bias (NSB) over that subperiod are
reported in table 4. We ran a dynamic simulation assuming (for numerical reasons) that these
changes took place progressively and smoothly over eighty quarters17, so that the net skill bias
evolves as shown in the left panel of gure 2. The right panel of the same gure reproduces the
simulated dynamic eects on the dierence between the high- and the low-skilled unemployment
rates (continuous line, left scale) and on the proportion of simple jobs held by high-skilled workers
(dotted line, right scale).
  NSB Uh= Ul=(1   ) dierence
Actual data
1980 0.29 0.23 1.26 4.3% 8.7% 4.4
1993 0.61 0.48 1.59 6.6% 18.6% 12.1
Simulated data
period 0 0.29 0.23 1.26 3.7% 8.9% 5.3
period 80 0.61 0.48 1.59 7.0% 20.8% 13.8




















Figure 2: Dynamic simulation with rigid relative wages: exogenous net skill bias change (left
panel), induced changes in the dierence between the high- and the low-skilled unemployment
rates (right panel, continuous line, left scale) and in crowding-out (dotted line, right scale)
The dynamic adjustment process can best be described by distinguishing two phases of equal
length. During the rst forty periods, the low- and the high-skilled unemployment rate increase
17This dynamic simulation should thus not be interpreted as a historical simulation. All simulations are done
with the Dynare software developed at Cepremap, Paris
24at the same pace, so that the dierence between the two remains unchanged. The rise in the
high-skilled unemployment rate, despite a favorable net technological bias, is due to matching
diculties and the time it takes to ll new complex job vacancies. High-skilled workers reduce
their unemployment risk by competing more actively with low-skilled workers on the simple job
market (crowding-out eect). After period 40, the high-skilled unemployment rate progressively
stabilizes and next starts declining until it reaches its new stationary state value; the low-
skilled unemployment rate goes on increasing for a few more periods and next stabilizes at
its new stationary state value. The dierence between the two unemployment rates becomes
progressively larger; there is more and more crowding-out, until the new stationary state is
reached.
4 Concluding remarks
Our objective in this paper was to examine the consequences of biased technological and labor
force composition changes on the unemployment rate of low- and high-skill groups. We con-
structed for that purpose a dynamic general equilibrium model with two types of jobs and two
types of workers, and with endogenous job competition and crowding-out eects. The model
was calibrated on Belgian data ( a country which in terms of wage and unemployment changes is
quite representative of the EU average) and simulated to evaluate the quantitative importance
of net skill bias eects over the last decades. Let us emphasize the following three results:
- our numerical simulations suggest that, when labor market institutions are such that
relative wages are rigid (as in many EU countries), most of the unemployment rate changes
observed between the late seventies and the mid nineties (moderate increase in the high-
skilled unemployment rate, huge increase in the low skilled unemployment rate) can be
explained by simply changing two exogenous parameters, technological bias and labor force
composition;
- search behaviors and job competition eects seem to play a crucial role; our numerical
simulations suggest that they may have considerably amplied the eects of the bias
technological change on the low-skilled unemployment rate; this result is obtained although
25the model generates a fairly low proportion of \over-qualied" workers (8.3%, while recent
estimates reported in the literature vary from 10 to 30%);
- the modelling of the production sector plays a crucial role; by distinguishing nal and
intermediate goods sectors, we avoid the assumption of perfect substitutability between
low- and high-skilled labor implicit in many search equilibrium models and obtain a spec-
ication similar to the one traditionally used in RBC models.
Many questions have of course not been addressed. The model should be further developed for
instance to explain rather than assume the wage rigidity, or to endogenize the job destruction
rate. Economic policy implications should also be investigated. We leave these questions for
future research.
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